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Church/State Interference 
in the Physician-Patient Relationship: 
View from Behind the Surgeon's Mask 
David Mayschak, M.D., M.A. 
Doctor Mayschak participated in a panel on "Church/State Inter-
ference in the Physician-Patient Relationship" at the 1981 NFCPG 
an'nual meeting in San Antonio, His topic was "View from Behind the 
Surgeon's Mask, " 
My delight in being invited to participate in this annual meeting of 
the National Federation is augmented by being in the beautiful city of 
the Alamo. It is both my pleasure and privilege to present this contri-
bution to the program. 
An apologia pro vita sua is needed preparatory to the observations 
and ideas I am about to share with you, for my view is somewhat 
jaundiced by the position from which I look around. Unlike the 
majority of physicians participating in this meeting, I am a resident-in-
training, specifically a resident in general surgery. The locus of my 
activities is not an office nor a private hospital. It is, rather, an 
academic institution, a teaching hospital, a quasi-charitable organiza-
tion. As such, the hospital provides not only for my care but also, as 
material for my apprenticeship, a cross-section of clients from the 
whole community. They may be the private patients of a faculty 
surgeon, or so-called staff patients. All the patients, however, are 
housed, investigated and treated in the huge and often confusing insti-
tution that is the University Hospital. 
As a surgical resident, I have been exposed to the full medical school 
curriculum and channeled into the more precise pedagogic and prac-
tical learning situation of the residency program in general surgery. 
There are certain axioms that pervade the atmosphere of such a 
program, and these are subtly inculcated into the young surgeon's 
thinking by aphorisms such as: " The successful surgeon is an aggres-
sive surgeon," or, "A chance to cut is a chance to cure," and "Don't 
ever let skin stand between you and a diagnosis." 
It is not surprising that in the minds of many of the common 
people there lies the suspicion that surgery falls into the category of 
mala in se .. . mala prohibita. Now the strictly legal sense of that 
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phrase means that an act which is in itself a criminal act and therefore 
unlawful, cannot be rendered lawful because the person to whose 
detriment it is done consents to it.l The formal meaning is not what I 
intend. Rather, it may be construed as a material evil in itself, in the 
sense of an act of violence. The common folk see it this way when, in 
anticipation of undergoing surgery, they verbalize it thus: "Well, 
tomorrow I go under the knife." Accordingly, there is a growing 
attitude that "surgery is now too important to be left in the hands of 
the surgeons." 2 
But how does the surgeon tolerate his craft being wrested from his 
hands? And by whom? 
Consider the daily scenario of the operating theater. One may 
argue, quite rationally, the necessity of delineating the operative field 
in sterile fashion. By reason of sterile precautions, however, the 
anonymity of surgeon and patient is symbolically maintained, thus 
mollifying the violence of the surgical act. Nonetheless, some opine 
that the surgeon frequently finds himself either operating in the 
shadow of the criminal law and its unclearly defined assault and negli-
gent homicide jurisdiction, or plying his craft under the pall of 
religious and moral criticism, with its often antiquated notions of 
surgical practice. 
Thus, at least on an implicit level, there appears to be equivocation 
about regarding surgical procedures as prima facie assaults, or in fact 
bona fide. How does the surgeon cope with this popular thinking? 
Where does this leave the surgeon who is practicing in an academic 
institution? In short, it entrenches him in a position of autonomy. At 
first blush, that may seem to be an unlikely conclusion, for, unlike the 
private practitioner, the institutionalized physician is buttressed and 
protected by the institution's legal division and a host of ancillary 
services. Within that framework, however, it is he who calls the shots. 
Let us clarify these notions with the help of a concrete example. 
Transplantation 
Clinical transplantation has largely been lifted out of the realm of 
experimental surgery. Whether one is dealing with homotransplanta-
tion, living-related donor transplantation or cadaveric organ trans-
plantation, there are a number of issues commonly encountered: 
1. organ procurement; 2. distribution or allocation of transplantable 
organs (a special case of Arthur Dyck's allocation of scarce life-
support resources); 3. definition of death; 4. technical expertise; 
5. auxiliary procedures to insure graft survival (for instance, lympho-
cyte-depletion systems). The last two are wholly technical and 
reserved to the surgical and medical sphere. 
Procurement of organs from living-related donors, when it is a ques-
tion of paired organs, provides little difficulty from a medico-legal 
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point of view, although in some cases religious objections are encoun-
tered. Cadaveric organ procurement is obviously intimately connected 
with the definition of death. Declaring a person "brain dead" while 
support measures still maintain a "physiologic preparation" to pre-
serve vital organs, is fraught with legal, religious and moral ramifica-
tions. It is said that "death is an event where medicine, religion and 
law meet around a human being in his last minutes." 3 The majority of 
commentators, however, seem to agree that the definition of death is a 
medical one only, to be applied by the physicians in attendance. 
Definitions of death, as proposed by various medical societies and 
associations, include certain common elements: 1. lack of spontaneous 
cardio-respiratory and motor function; 2. cessation of cerebral func-
tion by clinical standards; and 3. presuming the absence of anesthetic 
or sedative drug influence, the absence of cerebral activity as demon-
strated by electroencephalography. Those determinations are made by 
the physicians in charge - not the transplant surgeon - based on 
medically proposed definitions of clinical death. 
Allocation of organs is determined by two factors: 1. blood and 
tissue typing to provide a pool of prospective recipients, and screening 
those people by a committee to determine suitability of particular 
recipients; and 2. matching between recipient and donor tissues. 
Obviously there is a question of priorities here. First of all the opera-
tions themselves are costly and time-consuming in regard to their pre-
operative preparation, operative exigencies and post-operative care and 
hospitalization. Transplant operations and related procedures supplant 
a host of routine operations. Furthermore, there is a cost-benefit ratio 
which, in the minds of some, has not been adequately justified. What 
are we offering people, and to whom is the service being rendered? 
The mind of the people, the common sense, if you will, is seldom 
consulted. 
Probably the most sensitive area in this scheme is the procurement . 
of cadaveric organs. In order to successfully negotiate the demanding 
task of establishing a relationship with the shocked and grieving 
families, communicate the hopelessness of the situation, request dona-
tion of organs from the body of the loved one, follow through with 
the necessary but frustrating paper work, and walk at least part way 
with the family in its grief - to do this without giving the impression 
that around the corner hungry transplant surgeons lie in wait, 
impatiently whetting their knives, usually requires a Herculean effort. 
Indeed, a rapport and relationship must be established, and rapidly, 
for otherwise the project is unlikely to succeed, at least not without 
anger, guilt and recrimination. In this, the surgeon must view his 
contract with patients and family as well-nigh sacramental and 
inviolate. He brooks no interference from without. He wants that 
sanctuary reserved for this communion with patient and family. 
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Daily Rounds 
I have used transplantation as an illustration, perhaps almost as a 
caricature. I had entertained discussing other illustrations, some of 
which have already been addressed in this meeting: allocation of 
scarce resources, allocation of not-so-scarce resources, euthanasia and 
life support decisions, medical experimentation. All of these are more 
or less popular topics. They are, however, rooted in a much more 
fundamental phenomenon, namely the daily routine of the physician-
surgeon. What is more, those larger issues differ only in degree from 
the issues and decision-making the surgeon confronts in his daily 
rounds. It is here that he is buffered from the interference of govern-
ment regulations and ecclesiastical norms. 
Follow the academic surgeon in his daily trek. He moves from 
office to operating room, to ward, to emergency room, to office, to 
clinic, to meeting, to laboratory, describing a maze not only of geo-
graphical pathways but also of conflicting interests. Value judgments 
are inevitable. Simply the time he devotes to reading, research or 
paper work is time no longer available for seeing patients, assisting 
junior residents in the operating room, helping those evaluating 
emergencies. What determines to what extent he will allow his sub-
ordinates to manage the surgical service, to perform the operations, to 
delegate their own authority? 
Despite objections to the contrary, there is, in fact, a distinction 
made between the private and the staff patient. The policy is that all 
patients receive the same quality of care. The reality is that the faculty 
physician rarely, if ever, sees a hospitalized prison inmate until the 
patient is in the confinement of general anesthesia. The fact is that 
when a private patient is being operated on, the staff surgeon must be 
in attendance and usually is the primary operator. If you or I, or our 
wife, husband or parent were the patient in question, we would laud 
the practice. But were we of the anawim, God 's penniless, would we 
not object? But to whom? Who would be our advocate? Other 
examples bear out the double standard: the privilege of private patients 
to remain in hospital for inordinate periods of time, while others are 
more readily discharged to care for their wounds at home; the 
reassignment of interesting or attractive patients to a private service ; 
follow-up in the one-on-one private clinic instead of in the staff clinic 
where each week one may see a different doctor. 
Residents , although hungry for experience, are not strangers to the 
double standard. For example, given a young, attractive patient, the 
junior or senior resident may well finish the entire case by meticu-
lously closing skin with a subcuticular stitch guaranteed to leave a 
hairline scar. On the other hand, the ordinary staff patient may pro-
vide the opportunity for the intern to teach the medical student how 
to use the stapling device to close the incision. 
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We are aware of, and talk about, other subtle processes. Take the 
young black man brought into the emergency room with his second or 
third stab wound to the abdomen, or the jobless, reckless, drunken 
person who has totaled his cycle or auto in an accident that may have 
sacrificed or threatened innocent lives. Approaching these people does 
not bring a rush of warm feeling and empathy. Yet we triage and treat 
and take to the operating room - admittedly, perhaps, with a bit 
more roughness than is warranted, but we explain this by insisting on 
the need to expedite matters - and in fact we may perform a flawless 
operation. But what are the motivations active here? And what, if any, 
are the guiding principles? Often there is great ambivalence. As we 
work to save this person's life we ponder: "What are we doing to the 
gene pool by spending 70% of our operative time on recidivists, social 
deviants, other 'undesirables'?" Is not the governing factor in how 
expertly the surgery is performed or the patient managed no more than 
the surgeon's self-image, his pride, even egotism, or the fear of having 
to account for embarrassing post-operative complications? 
The state speaks of rights and injustices, and thus proposes liability 
as a governing force in its regulation of medical practice. Religion 
highlights the value of the person in se, and thus advocates care and 
concern, a certain altruism, as the capital consideration in evaluating 
motivation. The medical system, however, fosters fear, self-satisfaction 
and personal gain as primary motivational factors ; it discourages legal 
interference or religious incursions except as they support the above 
motives. 
It is within the confines of a strong physician-patient relationship 
that such a system can flourish. Surely, pride and egotism may have a 
lead role, but the doctor has at least opened himself to the possibility 
of true care and concern. Witness the results. Recently a middle-aged 
man with the Zollinger-Ellison syndrome was operated on for an 
abdominal aortic aneurysm . He had known gastrin om a metastases to 
the liver. Intraoperatively, his primary surgeon inspected the patient's 
liver and decided to perform a partial liver resection. Legally liable? 
Yes. Ethically reprehensible? Perhaps. Presumptuous? Assuredly. But 
the surgeon evidently knew the mind of his patient, and between the 
two existed such rapport that afterward the family could only laud 
the decision. Is this not a testimony to what many consider obsolete, 
namely the relationship between a physician and his patient? 
One may wonder where all these processes are examined with any 
objectivity, criticism or ethical analysis. Usually it is in the context of 
the morbidity and mortality conference. Ours, by tradition, is com-
posed of housestaff and representatives from the departments of 
anesthesiology and pathology. No others are ordinarily invited. 
Medical student attendance is tacitly discouraged. The "M and M" 
conference is wholly intramural Those cases, however, that involve 
forensic pathology naturally presume state interference in the post-
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mortem discussion. Mistaken diagnoses, complications, and deaths 
outside the coroner's jurisdiction receive the attention only of the 
surgical family. Attitudes come to light in unexpected ways in these 
situations. For example, recently, as we were discussing the plethora 
of medical chart notes written by members of ancillary services, one 
elderly faculty member joined in the lament with the comment: "Yes, 
and we would be a lot better off if we got all the ecclesiastics out of 
the hospital so we could get on with our work!" Thus in a forum 
wherein surgical practice and practices might benefit from modulation 
of an internal critical apparatus, outsiders are systematically excluded. 
Summary 
So you see, the day-to-day work of a surgeon depends primarily on 
the relationship with his patients. The expertise of his practice is held 
up for criticism or commendation largely within a closed forum of 
evaluation. The need for intervention on the part of secular or reli-
gious authorities represents a failure of the patient-physician relation-
ship. (For example, the clergyman is called if there is difficulty obtain-
ing consent for an autopsy, or if the physician cannot quite handle an 
effusive grief reaction.) These dynamics differ only in degree from the 
larger medical, legal and religious issues more popularly discussed. 
Conclusions 
We can make some conclusions from these observations. The con-
clusions, however, generate further questions. 
1. There is a need for governmental regulations in medical practice, 
in general fashion, however, as merely proposing guidelines. 
Question: Is not actual implementation of guidelines best carried 
out by regulatory bodies within the profession? 
2. Pastoral or religious intervention is often necessary, but generally 
unrelated to daily medical decision-making, and, in fact, is 
usually unwanted by the professional community. 
Question: Where lies the prophetic mission of churchmen in 
exposing injustices within the system and the false pride of 
some of its practitioners? 
"3. Particular decision-making is largely a medical matter, demanding 
medical expertise and collaboration. 
Question : Is that enough? Why are para-medical advisers discour-
aged from having anything more than a subordinate and sub-
sidiary role? 
4. The physician-patient relationship is of primary importance and 
at the crux of effective medical practice. 
Question: How well does the physician understand his own 
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motivations underlying value judgments and moral decision-
making? 
5. The double standard in medical care is a reality, and it implies an 
all-embracing set of values regarding the importance, usefulness, 
productivity and worth of particular patients. 
Question: Is such a standard inevitable? Is it, in fact, morally 
unacceptable? How can it be effectively criticized? 
6. Autonomy is a primary value for the physician, and the religious 
or even humanistic doctor can probably function adequately on 
his own. 
Question: What, however, is the physician's own support system, 
and how effective can it be? Before whom does the surgeon 
drop his mask? 
The queries raised here are of crucial importance for the integrity of 
medical practice, but they cannot be answered in a facile manner. 
They must prick our moral conscience and occupy our ethical reflec-
tions for a long time to come. 
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